Securing AI Agents: The Runtime Guardrail Gap
Model providers ship LLMs without production runtime protection. See why that gap exists and what runtime guardrails must address.
Articles cover AI agent security, prompt injection, and safe production pipelines.
Model providers ship LLMs without production runtime protection. See why that gap exists and what runtime guardrails must address.
SQL injection spread when untrusted data became executable syntax; prompt injection repeats that structural error with user-controlled inputs.
Clean user requests can still trigger attacks when agents retrieve hostile instructions from web pages, documents, or database records.
A tool allowlist cannot verify whether an allowed call fits the task. This article explains how runtime checks detect unauthorized actions.
A practical taxonomy of five attacks on deployed AI agents, including context hijacking, indirect injection, tool override, context poisoning, and data exfiltration.
Production agent security can stay within the latency budget. We measured semantic injection checks and the cost of keeping p99 response time in bounds.
A practical pre-launch review for LLM pipelines, covering untrusted data entry points, trust boundaries, tool risk, and required controls.
Our red-team exercises exposed weak layer boundaries, simple attack patterns, and practical controls that reduced risk in tool-using agents.
A stage-by-stage map of adversarial entry points spanning user input, prompt assembly, retrieval, reasoning, and tool execution.
Context inserted early in a long-running agent workflow can alter every later step. Learn how to detect and prevent poisoning across turns.
OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google focus on model safety, while runtime protection for deployed agents remains an application-layer responsibility.